Our Team

Edward S. Prescott

Ned Prescott was a vice president in the Research Department at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond from 2007 to 2016. Prescott joined the Richmond Fed as an economist in 1995. He is currently a senior economic and policy advisor at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.

Personal Website

Bank Publications

Honoring Marvin Goodfriend, May 2022

Federal Reserve Structure and Economic Ideas

Marvin Goodfriend's views on the proper role of a central bank and his defense of the federal structure of the Federal Reserve System.

Michael D. Bordo and Edward S. Prescott

Economic Brief, June 2015, No. 15-06

Did Banking Reforms of the Early 1990s Fail? Lessons from Comparing Two Banking Crises

Eliana Balla, Helen Fessenden, Edward S. Prescott and John R. Walter

Economic Brief, March 2015, No. 15-03

Explaining the Decline in the Number of Banks since the Great Recession

The rate of new-bank formation has fallen from an average of about 100 per year since 1990 to an average of about three per year since 2010. If this change persists, it will have a large impact on the composition of the banking sector as well as the flow of credit in the economy.

Roisin McCord, Edward S. Prescott and Tim Sablik

Economic Quarterly, First Quarter 2014

The Financial Crisis, the Collapse of Bank Entry, and Changes in the Size Distribution of Banks

Roisin McCord and Edward S. Prescott

Economic Quarterly, Second Quarter 2013

Too Big to Manage? Two Book Reviews

Edward S. Prescott

Economic Quarterly, First Quarter 2012

Contingent Capital: The Trigger Problem

Edward S. Prescott

Economic Brief, February 2012, No. 12-02

Experimenting with Contingent Capital Triggers

Edward S. Prescott and David A. Price

Economic Quarterly, First Quarter 2011

A Regional Look at the Role of House Prices and Labor Market Conditions in Mortgage Default

We study the regional variation in foreclosure rates in more detail by examining two localities in our district: Prince William County, Virginia, and Charlotte, North Carolina.

Sonya Ravindranath Waddell, Anne Davlin and Edward S. Prescott

Economic Quarterly, First Quarter 2010

Introduction to the Special Issue on the Diamond-Dybvig Model

Edward S. Prescott

Economic Brief, May 2009, No. 09-05

The Costs and Benefits of Bank Supervisory Disclosure

Edward S. Prescott and Stephen Slivinski

Economic Quarterly, Winter 2008

Should Bank Supervisors Disclose Information About Their Banks?

Edward S. Prescott

Economic Quarterly, Fall 2006

Changes in the Size Distribution of U. S. Banks: 1960 - 2005

Hubert P. Janicki and Edward S. Prescott

Economic Quarterly, Fall 2005

Technological Design and Moral Hazard

Edward S. Prescott

Economic Quarterly, Fall 2004

Auditing and Bank Capital Regulation

Edward S. Prescott

Economic Quarterly, Fall 2003

Firms, Assignments, and Earnings

Edward S. Prescott

Economic Quarterly, Spring 2002

Can Risk-Based Deposit Insurance Premiums Control Moral Hazard?

Edward S. Prescott

Economic Quarterly, Summer 2001

Regulating Bank Capital Structure to Control Risk

Edward S. Prescott

Economic Quarterly, Fall 1999

Means of Payment, the Unbanked, and EFT '99

Edward S. Prescott and Daniel D. Tatar

Economic Quarterly, Winter 1999

A Primer on Moral-Hazard Models

Edward S. Prescott

Economic Quarterly, Fall 1997

Group Lending and Financial Intermediation: An Example

Edward S. Prescott

Economic Quarterly, Winter 1997

The Pre-Commitment Approach in a Model of Regulatory Banking Capital

Edward S. Prescott
Working Papers

May 2015, No. 15-05

Did the Financial Reforms of the Early 1990s Fail? A Comparison of Bank Failures and FDIC Losses in the 1986-92 and 2007-13 Periods

Eliana Balla, Edward S. Prescott and John R. Walter

February 2015, No. 15-02

Fixed Prices and Regulatory Discretion as Triggers for Contingent Capital Conversion: An Experimental Examination

Douglas Davis and Edward S. Prescott

March 2013, No. 13-03R

Banker Compensation, Relative Performance, and Bank Risk (Revised November 2019)

Arantxa Jarque and Edward S. Prescott

November 2011, No. 11-07

Contingent Capital: The Trigger Problem

Edward S. Prescott

March 2011, No. 11-01R

An Experimental Analysis of Contingent Capital Triggering Mechanisms (Revised Oct. 2011)

Douglas Davis, Edward S. Prescott and Oleg Korenok

October 2010, No. 10-16R

Deferred Pay for Bank Employees: Implications of Hidden Actions with Persistent Effects in Time (Revised September 2015)

Arantxa Jarque and Edward S. Prescott

November 2006, No. 06-12

Market-Based Regulation and the Informational Content of Prices

Philip Bond, Itay Goldstein and Edward S. Prescott

November 2005, No. 05-11

Firms as Clubs in Walrasian Markets with Private Information: Technical Appendix

Edward S. Prescott and Robert Townsend

February 2004, No. 04-2

State-Contingent Bank Regulation With Unobserved Actions and Unobserved Characteristics

David A. Marshall and Edward S. Prescott

July 2003, No. 03-9

Mechanism Design and Assignment Models

Edward S. Prescott and Robert Townsend

November 2000, No. 00-11

Incentives, Communication, and Payment Instruments

Alternative payment instruments are studied in an economy with private information, delayed communication, and limited commitment.

Edward S. Prescott and John A. Weinberg

September 2000, No. 00-8

Firms as Clubs in Walrasian Markets with Private Information

Edward S. Prescott and Robert Townsend

June 1998, No. 98-6

Computing Moral Hazard Problems Using the Dantzig-Wolfe Decomposition Algorithm

Edward S. Prescott

June 1996, No. 96-2

Theory of the Firm: Applied Mechanism Design

Edward S. Prescott and Robert Townsend

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